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Abstract
Potential critical risks of cascading failures in power systems can be identified by exposing
those critical electrical elements on which certain initial disturbances may cause maximum
disruption to power transmission networks. In this work, we investigate cascading failures in
power systems described by the direct current (DC) power flow equations, while initial dis-
turbances take the form of altering admittance of elements. The disruption is quantified with
the remaining transmission power at the end of cascading process. In particular, identifying
the critical elements and the corresponding initial disturbances causing the worst-case cas-
cading blackout is formulated as a dynamic optimization problem (DOP) in the framework
of optimal control theory, where the entire propagation process of cascading failures is put
under consideration. An Identifying Critical Risk Algorithm (ICRA) based on the maximum
principle is proposed to solve the DOP. Simulation results on the IEEE 9-Bus and the IEEE
14-Bus test systems are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm.
Index Terms—Cascading failures, critical elements, initial disturbances, dynamic opti-
mization, maximum principle.
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1 Introduction
Almost all human systems and activities strongly depend on critical energy infrastructures (e.g.,
electric power systems). Large-scale power blackouts in the past decades, such as the North
America blackout on August 14, 2003 [1], the Europe interconnected grid blackout on November
12, 2006 [2] and Brazil blackout on November 10, 2009 [3], suggest that power blackouts are
not uncommon in spite of technological progress and great investments in power systems [4].
Although such large blackouts are rare events, they have the potential to result in in-operability,
huge economic losses, or even state panics. Cascading failures in bulk power systems are an
essential cause of blackouts [5]. A cascading blackout usually starts with one or more triggering
initial disturbances that lead to dramatic redistributions of power flows and a variety of drastic
phenomena throughout the power network [6]. Therefore, identifying critical risk of cascading
failures in power systems is of great interest to researchers and power system planners. Certain
disturbances on some elements may lead to the worst power losses or severest isolations of power
systems, making these elements the critical elements for cascading failures in power systems [7].
To identify the critical elements and the corresponding initial disturbances applied on them
that cause the worst-case cascading blackout in power systems, a novel approach within the
framework of optimal control theory is proposed in this paper.
A variety of approaches have been proposed to identify critical electrical elements and ini-
tial attacks, or to assess the criticality or vulnerability for power systems. In [8], identifying
critical system components (e.g., transmission lines, generators, transformers) is formulated
into a bi-level optimization model; and a heuristic algorithm is developed to solve the prob-
lem and obtain a local optimal solution. In [9], the problem is recast into a standard mixed-
integer linear programming problem, which can be solved by using various solvers. The resulted
mixed-integer bi-level programming formulation in [8][9] is relaxed into an equivalent single-level
mixed-integer linear programming problem by replacing the inner optimization problem with
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions [10]. As an extension of [8], a new approach
based on “Global Benders Decomposition” is proposed to solve the large-scale power system
interdiction problem when transmission lines are under attacks; and the algorithm can guaran-
tee the convergence of the bi-level optimization solution [11]. In [12], identifying the criticality
and vulnerability of the electric grid is formulated as a non-linear bi-level programming problem
and the genetic algorithm is appiled to reach near optimal solutions with moderate computing
time. In [13], finding a strategic defense to minimize the damages of an attack is formulated
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as a multi-level mixed-integer programming problem. A Tabu Search with an embedded greedy
algorithm is implemented to find the optimum defense strategy. In [14], an improved interdiction
model that combines the evaluation of both short-term (seconds to minutes) and medium-term
(minutes to days) impacts of possible electric grid attacks to identify the worst one is proposed;
an integer programming heuristic is then applied to solve the problem. Power grid performance
indices including overall voltage deviation and the minimal load shedding are quantified in [15]
based on the alterinating current (AC) power flow model, where finding the most disruptive
attack is formulated as either a non-linear programming or a non-linear bi-level optimization
problem, both of which can be solved by common algorithms. In [16], both static and dy-
namic deterministic indices are included in the process of ranking critical nodes; a new ranking
algorithm is proposed and evaluated by extensive Monte Carlo simulations.
In most of the existing work on identifying the critical elements and the initial disturbances
causing the worst-case cascading blackout, the problem is usually formulated as a static optimiza-
tion problem which neglects the entire propagation process of the cascading failures. Though
such a problem is relatively easier to be solved, the results however may be misleading as they
may not properly reflect the system dynamics and evolution in the real life.
The main contributions in this paper are twofold. Firstly, we formulate the problem of
identifying the critical elements and the corresponding initial disturbances causing the worst-
case cascading blackout as a dynamic optimization problem (DOP) in the framework of optimal
control theory, which enables us to investgate the entire propagation process of cascading failures.
Secondly, the identifying critical risk algorithm (ICRA) based on the maximum principle of
optimal control theory [17][18][19] is proposed to solve the DOP, which guarantees fulfilling the
necessary condition for the optimal solutions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the DOP based
on the DC power flow equations and cascading failure model. In Section 3, the solution based
on the maximum principle is introduced in detail. Section 4 presents results from calculations
based on the IEEE standard data and verifies the correctness of the results. Finally, we conclude
this work and present some future work in Section 5.
2 Problem Formulation
In this section, identifying the critical elements and the corresponding initial disturbances is
formulated as a dynamic optimization problem (DOP). The DC power flow model, relay-based
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overloading branch tripping model and cascading failure model are discussed in Section 2.1, and
the DOP formulation is presented in Section 2.2.
2.1 Notations and Models
A. Notations
We summarize the power system notations used in later sections as follows:
• Number of buses: Nb
• Number of electrical elements: N
• Active power at bus i : Pi
• Active power from bus i to bus j : Pij
• Voltage phase at bus i : θi
• Voltage phase difference between bus i and bus j: θij
• Admittance at element i : ypi
The admittance of an element includes admittance of transformer (if any) and transmission
branch. The admittance information of a power system can be described by the element ad-
mittance vector YP = [yp1 yp2 · · · ypN ]T . An initial disturbance is specified by means of
altering admittance at the corresponding element of YP . The nodal admittance matrix Y can be
determined by Y = ATYPA, where A is the element-node incidence matrix [20][21]. In the prop-
agation process of cascading failures, the time-varying element admittance vector YP and the
time-invariant element-node incidence matrix A are applied to determine the nodal admittance
matrix Y for the convenience of analysis of the approach in later sections.
B. DC Power Flow Model
In a power system, power flow equations are used to estimate the flow values for each branch. The
DC power flow model is deployed since we only study on high-voltage transmission networks
in this paper: adopting the DC model helps avoid some difficulties in numerical calculations
without sacrificing the validity of the results [22].
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In the AC power flow model, the active power flow Pij is determined as:
Pij =
|Ui||Uj |
zij
sinθij (1)
where |Ui| is the voltage amplitude at bus i, zij is the element impedance. Under the following
assumptions that i) resistance of transmission element is ignored so that element impedance
approximately equals element reactance; ii) voltage phase differences are small enough and iii)
there is a flat voltage profile [23], the above non-linear equation can be linearised into the DC
power flow equation.
Pij =
θij
xij
= yijθij (2)
Further, the power flow equation can be modelled into matrix format as follows:
P = ATYPAθ (3)
where P is the vector of active power injections, vector θ contains the voltage angles at each
bus, and ATYPA is the nodal admittance matrix Y . Due to ignorance of power loss in the DC
power flow equations, all the active power injections are known in advance. Once given the
nodal admittance matrix, the voltage angles at each bus can be determined by
θ = (ATYPA)
−1P (4)
After obtaining the voltage angle value at each bus, the power flow through each element can
be computed by Eq. (2).
C. Relay-Based Overloading Branch Tripping Model
In a power system, transmission branches are protected by circuit breakers, and branch tripping
is one of the most common factors responsible for cascading failures. A circuit breaker trips a
transmission branch when the demand load of the branch exceeds a certain threshold level, in
order to prevent that transmission branch from being permanently damaged due to overloading
[24].
For simplicity, in this paper we assume a deterministic model of transmission branch tripping
mechanism. Specifically, a circuit breaker for branch li trips at the moment when the demand
load on the branch li exceeds its maximum capacity (threshold value). The maximum capacity
of a branch is defined as the maximum power flow that can be afforded by the branch. This
maximum power flow value is decided by thermal, stability and/or voltage drop constraints.
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In real-life infrastructures, this value may be constrained by cost as well. The relay-based
overloading branch tripping model is presented as follows, where the threshold value of a branch
is related to its initial load:
Ctr1i = αiLi(0) i = 1, 2, ..., N (5)
where Li(0) is the initial demand load, and αi is the tolerance parameter of line li.
The mechanism of the relay protection above may be resembled by a step function: when the
real load of a branch is less than or equal to the threshold value, the circuit breaker of the branch
is in the status of on; otherwise, it is in the status off . To facilitate derivative calculations, a
smooth function g is introduced to resemble the step function, ensuing the differentiability of
the function at switching points:
gi(pij , Ctr1i) =

1, |pij | ≤
√
C2tr1i − pi2a
1−sina(|p2ij |−C2tr1i)
2 ,
√
C2tr1i − pi2a ≤ |pij | ≤
√
C2tr1i +
pi
2a
0, |pij | ≥
√
C2tr1i +
pi
2a
(6)
where Ctr1i(i = 1, 2, ..., N) is the threshold value of a branch, a is a parameter to regulate the
slope of the function. With the smooth function gi(pij , Ctr1i), the diagonal relay tripping matrix
G(pij , Ctr1i) can be defined as follows:
G(pij , Ctr1i) =

g1(pij , Ctr11)
g2(pij , Ctr12)
. . .
gN (pij , Ctr1N )

D. Cascading Failure Model
In this subsection, the cascading failure model reflecting the entire propagation process of cas-
cading failures is presented. A cascading failure is a sequence of events in which an initial
disturbance, or a set of disturbances, triggers a sequence of one or more dependent element
outages. The initial disturbances include a wide variety of exogenous disturbances such as high
winds, lightning, natural disasters, contact between conductors and vegetation, or human errors
[25]. For simplicity, we assume that the initial disturbances take the form of altering admittance
along transmission branches.
6
From Eq. (6) and the diagonal relay tripping matrix G(pij , Ctr1i), the cascading failure model
in matrix format can be built as follows:
Y k+1P = G[P
k
ij(Y
k
P ), Ctr1]Y
k
P +Diag[−u(k)]F (uk) k = 0, 1, 2, ... (7)
where k is the iteration step of cascading failures, u(k) is the input vector of external distur-
bances. When k = 0, the input vector u(0) denotes the initial disturbances. The vector F (uk)
is defined as follows:
F(uki, Ctr2i) =

f1(uk1, Ctr21)
f2(uk2, Ctr22)
...
fN (ukN , Ctr2N )

Similar to that in Eq. (6), for facilitating derivative calculations, a smooth function fi(uki, Ctr2i)
is applied for every element of the vector F (uk). The smooth function fi(uki, Ctr2i) is defined
as follows:
fi(uki, Ctr2i) =

0, |uki| ≤
√
C2tr2i − pi2b
1+sinb(|u2ki|−C2tr2i)
2 ,
√
C2tr2i − pi2b ≤ |uki| ≤
√
C2tr2i +
pi
2b
1, |uki| ≥
√
C2tr2i +
pi
2b
(8)
where Ctr2 is the threshold value vector and b is a parameter that regulates the slope of the
function f . The returning value of the function fi(uki, Ctr2i) is determined by comparing the
threshold value Ctr2i with the corresponding external disturbance, where the critical element is
determined when the function f returns the value one.
2.2 Dynamic Optimization Problem Formulation
Based on the models presented above, the DOP formulation in the framework of optimal control
theory can be defined as follows:
Formulation of DOP: Given a power system, determining a control input vector uk ∈ Ω,
such that the remaining transmission power at the end of cascading process is minimized. As-
sume that the system is described by the DC power flow equations in Eq. (2) and its cascading
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failure model by Eq. (7). We have
min
uk∈Ω
J (9)
J = ||PN ||2F + 
Nc−1∑
k=0
[ 1max{0,1−k} × 1max2{0,Nn−||F (uk)||2} ] (10)
s.t.
Y
k+1
P = G[P
k
ij(Y
k
P ), Ctr1]Y
k
P +Diag[−u(k)]F (uk)
Pij = yijθij
(11)
where the Frobenius norm of power transmission matrix ||PN ||2F equals
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(PNij )
2, Nc is the
total iteration steps of cascading failures, Nn is a parameter that denotes the number of critical
elements, ‖ · ‖ denotes 2 norm of a vector and  is the weight of the cost function. In Eq. (10),
the terminal constraint ||PN ||2F dominates the cost function by setting the weight  to be small
enough.
Remark 2.1. As above mentioned, the critical elements are those elements which, when being
attacked, will trigger the worst-case cascading blackout with the minimum transmission power
remaining in the system. The critical elements and their IDs can be determined by the vector
F (u(k)) once the optimal control input vector u(k) is obtained.
Remark 2.2. From the DOP formulation presented above, we can see that the external dis-
turbances are only applied in the first step (k = 0), that is, the initial disturbance vector u(0).
The DOP formulation can be extended to the case where external disturbances or control inputs
are applied in different steps, which helps facilitate future studies on human errors in cascading
failures and protection reactions.
3 DOP Solution
The DOP can essentially be viewed as a control problem, where we search for an optimal control
input vector u(k) to pin the power gird to certain worst-case cascading blackout defined in
Eq. (10). In this section, the ICRA based on the maximum principle of the optimal control theory
is applied to solve the DOP as presented in Eqs. (9), (10) and (11). The maximum principle is
a powerful method for the computation of optimal controls, with the crucial advantages that it
does not require prior evaluation of the infimal cost function and provides necessary conditions
for optimality of solutions. In the following, the Lagrange multiplier method in the maximum
principle is presented in detail.
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Introduce the Lagrange multipliers [λk+1] , [λ1, ..., λN ], λk+1 ∈ Rn (usually referred to as
adjoint variables) to the Eqs. (9), (10) and (11). The Lagrangian function shall be as follows:
L(YP , λ) , ||PN (Y NP )||2F + 
Nc−1∑
k=0
[
1
max {0, 1− k} ×
1
max2 {0, Nn − ||F (uk)||2} ]
+λTk+1
{
G[P kij(Y
k
P ), Ctr1]Y
k
P +Diag[−u(k)]F (uk)− Y k+1P
} (12)
where λ , [λT1 λT1 ... λTN ]T .
To guarantee the existence of the partial derivative ∂Y k+1P /∂Y
k
P , hereafter we make the
assumption that each sub-network that is isolated due to redistributions of power flows in the
cascading process, the partial derivative ∂Y k+1P /∂Y
k
P can be non-singular or reduced-order non-
singular on Rn × Ω [26].
Let
Y ∗P , [(Y ∗0 )T ... (Y ∗N )T (u∗0)T ... (u∗N−1)T ]T
be the minimising vector corresponding to the sequences [(Y ∗0 ) ... (Y ∗N )] and [u
∗
0 ... u
∗
N−1].
Observe that the dual feasibility condition in the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality condi-
tions is equivalent to the statement that there exists λ∗ , [(λ∗1)T (λ∗2)T ... (λ∗N )T ]T such that
the partial derivative ∂L/∂YP of the Lagrangian function vanishes at (Y
∗
P , λ
∗).
Therefore, there hold the following conditions
∂L(Y ∗P ,λ
∗)
∂Y kP
= 0
∂L(Y ∗P ,λ
∗)
∂uk
= 0
(13)
where ∂L
∂Y kP
and ∂L∂uk denote the row vectors of partial derivatives
∂L
∂Y kP
, [ ∂L
∂Y kP1
... ∂L
∂Y kPN
]
∂L
∂uk
, [ ∂L
∂u1k
... ∂L∂umk
]
To perform the differentiations above, the Hamiltonian H: Rn×Rm×Rn → R defined as follows
is introduced
H(Y kP , uk, λk) , 
Nc−1∑
k=0
[
1
max {0, 1− k} ×
1
max2 {0, Nn − ||F (uk)||2} ]
+λTk+1
{
G[P kij(Y
k
P ), Ctr1]Y
k
P +Diag[−u(k)]F (uk)
} (14)
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where the first term of the Hamiltonian H (denoted as L) is the per-stage weighting in the cost
function.
Note that 
∂H
∂Y kP
= ∂L
∂Y kP
+ λTk
∂Y k+1P
∂Y kP
∂H
∂uk
= ∂L∂uk + λ
T
k
∂Y k+1P
∂uk
where 
∂L
∂Y kP
, [ ∂L
∂Y kP1
... ∂L
∂Y kPN
]
∂L
∂uk
, [ ∂L
∂u1k
... ∂L∂umk
]
Thus, the following conditions hold
∂L(Y ∗P , λ
∗)
∂Y kP
=
∂H(Y k∗P , (u∗k), λ∗k+1)
∂Y kP
− (λ∗k)T = 0 (15)
∂L(Y ∗P , λ
∗)
∂Y NP
=
∂(||PN (Y NP )||2F )
∂Y kP
− (λ∗N )T = 0 (16)
∂L(Y ∗P , λ
∗)
∂uk
=
∂H(Y k∗P , (u∗k), λ∗k)
∂uk
= 0 (17)
Further, the following equations can be obtained
(i) State equation:
Y
(k+1)∗
P = G[P
k
ij(Y
k∗
P ), Ctr1]Y
k
P +Diag[−u(k)]F ∗(uk) (18)
(ii) Adjoint equation:
(λ∗k)
T =
∂H(Y k∗P , F ∗(uk), λ∗k+1)
∂Y kP
(19)
(iii) Boundary equation:
(λ∗N )
T =
∂(||PN (Y NP )||2F )
∂Y NP
(20)
(iv) Hamiltonian condition:
∂H(Y k∗P , u∗k, λ∗k+1)
∂uk
= 0 (21)
We show the main steps for solving Eqs. (18), (19), (20) and (21).
First, we solve the adjoint equations. From Eqs. (14) and (19), the following equation can
be obtained
λ∗k = (
∂Y k+1P
∂Y kP
)Tλ∗k+1 (22)
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where the dimension of
∂Y k+1P
∂Y kP
is N ×N . From Eq. (11), we know that each element of Y k+1P can
be determined by
yk+1P,i = gi(p
k
ij , Ctr1i)y
k
P,i +Diag[−u(k)]iifi(uk) (23)
Hence, from Eqs. (22) and (23), the following partial derivative can be obtained
∂yk+1P,i
∂ykP,i
=
∂gi
∂pkij
· ∂p
k
ij
∂ykP,is
· ykP,i + gi(pkij , Ctr1i) s = 1, 2, ..., i, ..., Nc (24)
where the partial derivative of
∂pkij
∂ykP,is
is the constant zero except when s = i. The term ∂gi
∂Pkij
is
as follows:
∂gi
∂P kij
=
−a · p
k
ijcosa(|p2ij | − C2tr1i),
√
C2tr1i − pi2a ≤ |pij | ≤
√
C2tr1i +
pi
2a
0, otherwise
(25)
and the term
∂pkij
∂ykP,is
is unknown which will be determined in the later part.
Second, we determine the boundary equation. The DC power flow equations are incorporated
into the cascading failure model in Eq. (7) to get the expression of active power function as
follows:
P kij = (Aei)
TDiag(Y kP )(Aej)(ei − ej)T [ATDiag(Y kP )A]−1P (26)
where the vector of the active power P is known for each iteration step. Meanwhile, the expres-
sion of the active power in the final step can be determined by
PNij = (Aei)
TDiag(Y NP )(Aej)(ei − ej)T [ATDiag(Y NP )A]−1P
From Eqs. (20) and (26), the following equations can be obtained
(λ∗N )
T =
∂[
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(PNij )]
2
∂Y NP
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
2PNij
∂pNij
∂yNP
(27)
∂pNij
∂yNP,is
= (Aei)
T ∂Diag(Y
N
P )
∂yNP,is
(Aej)(ei − ej)T [ATDiag(Y NP )A]−1P
+(Aei)
TDiag(Y NP )(Aej)(ei − ej)T
∂[ATDiag(Y NP )A]
−1
∂yNP,is
P
(28)
For simplicity, the matrix Eii is used to represent the term
∂Diag(Y NP )
∂yNP,is
. Then Eq. (28) can be
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transferred into
∂pNij
∂yNP,is
= (Aei)
TEii(Aej)(ei − ej)T [ATDiag(Y NP )A]−1P
+ (Aei)
TDiag(Y NP )(Aej)(ei − ej)T · [[−ATDiag(Y NP )A]−1 ·ATEiiA · [ATDiag(Y NP )A]−1]P
(29)
Finally, we determine the Hamiltonian condition

∂[ 1max{0,1−k} × 1max2{0,Nn−||F ∗(uk)||2)} ]
∂uk
+
∂[λTk+1Diag[−u(k)]F ∗(uk)]
∂uk
= 0 (30)
where F ∗(uk) and uk are vectors with an N × 1 dimension. The following equation can be
acquired according to Eq. (30)
4
max {0, 1− k} ×max3 {0, Nn − ||F ∗(uk)||2} [F
∗(uk)]T
∂F ∗(uk)
∂uk
−λTk+1
{
Diag[−F (u(k)] + ∂F
∗(uk)
∂uk
}
= 0
(31)
where the term ∂F
∗(uk)
∂uk
is as follows:
∂F ∗(uk)
∂uk
=

∂f∗(uk1)
∂uk1
0 . . . 0
0 ∂f
∗(uk2)
∂uk2
. . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . ∂f
∗(ukn)
∂ukn

and the term
∂f∗i (uk)
∂uki
is
∂f∗i (uk)
∂uki
=
bukicosb(|u
2
ki| − C2tr2i),
√
C2tr2i − pi2b ≤ |uki| ≤
√
C2tr2i +
pi
2b
0, otherwise
Now, necessary optimality conditions for the control input to be the minimisers of the op-
timization problem is derived. From Eqs. (20) and (22), the recursion formula for Lagrange
multipliers is determined as
λk+1 =
N−k−2∏
s=0
(
∂Y N−sP
∂Y N−s−1P
)TλN s = 1, 2, ..., Nc − 1 (32)
The solution of DOP can be determined by the following equations
4
max{0,1−k}×max3{0,Nn−||F ∗(uk)||2} [F (uk)]
T ∂F (uk)
∂uk
−
N−k−2∏
s=0
(
∂Y N−sP
∂Y N−s−1P
)λTN
{
Diag[−F (u(k)] + ∂F (uk)∂uk
}
= 0
Y k+1P = G[P
k
ij(Y
k
P ), Ctr1]Y
k
P +Diag[−u(k)]F (uk)
(33)
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Table 1: Identifying Critical Risk Algorithm
1: Set the maximum step i = imax, i = 0 and J
∗ = Jmin
2: while (i <= imax)
3: Solve the nonlinear algebraic equations in Eq. (33)
4: Determine the control input (external disturbances) u(k)
5: Validate the control input u(k) in Eq. (7)
6: Compute the resulting cost function J i in Eq. (10)
7: Determine the IDs of critical elements F (uk) in Eq. (8)
8: if (J i > J∗)
9: Set u∗ = ui and J∗ = J i
10: end if
11: Set i = i+ 1
12: end while
where Y kP and u(k) are two unknown variables. The algorithm on identifying critical risk of
cascading failures in power systems, denoted as ICRA, is summarized in the Table 1.
4 Simulation Results and Verification
We consider two different cases for identifying the critical risks of cascading failures in power
systems.
Case 1: Both the critical elements and corresponding initial disturbances are unknown
variables.
Case 2: The initial disturbances are given as branch outage where the critical elements
remain to be identified. In this case, since the initial disturbances have to be element outages,
we replace the vector u(k) in Eq. (7) with the initial nodal admittance matrix Y 0P .
Note that the Case 2 above is a special case of Case 1. We are particularly interested in
this special case for two reasons: (i) in practice, branch outage is a common type of failures [27];
and (ii) for this special case, the optimality of the solutions in small or medium-sized systems
could be verified by brute force i.e., by considering all the possible combinations of branch outage
cases with a given number of outage branches. In simulations, we use Matlab with fsolve as the
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non-linear solver for solving Y kP and uk. For the test case data and calculation of the electric
circuit parameters, the codes from Matpower are used extensively.
A. Simulation Results
The test case of the IEEE 9-Bus system contains 3 generators, 6 branches, 3 loads and 2 winding
power transformers. The test case of the IEEE 14-Bus system consists of 14 buses, 5 generators
and 11 loads. Information about these two test cases and algorithmic parameters are presented
in Table 2.
Table 2: Information of Two Test cases
Information Test Case 1 (9-Bus) Test Case 2 (14-Bus)
Filename (in Matpower) case9.m case14.m
Number of Nodes 9 14
Number of Elements Ne 9 20
Iteration Steps Nc 10 14
Weight of Cost Function  0.02 0.02
Parameter a and b 5× 105 8× 105
Threshold Value Vector Ctr2 Yp1 Yp2 − 4E14×1
Initial Value Vector of Solver −10 ∗ rand(Ne, Nc + 1) −9 ∗ rand(Ne, Nc + 1)
Therein, Yp1 = [−17.36,−10.87,−5.88,−17.06,−9.92,−13.89,−16.00,−6.21] and Yp2 = [−16.90,
−4.48,−5.05,−5.67,−5.75,−5.85,−23.75−4.78,−1.80,−3.97,−5.03,−3.91,−7.68,−5.68,−9.09,
− 11.83,−3.70,−5.21,−5.00,−2.87] are the initial susceptance vectors of elements in per-unit
for the 9-Bus and the 14-Bus test systems respectively. The threshold value vector Ctr1 for the 9-
Bus and the 14-Bus test systems are [0.8, 1.8, 1.0, 0.5, 0.5, 1.0, 0.8, 0.7, 0.5] and [1.8, 1.0, 1.0, 0.8, 0.6,
0.5, 0.9, 0.5, 0.4, 0.7, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.1, 0.6, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1], respectively.
We first carry out simulations of Case 1. For the IEEE 9-Bus test system, the number
of critical elements Nn is set as 1. For the IEEE 14-Bus test system, the number of critical
elements Nn is set as 1 and 2. The results are presented in Table 3.
We then conduct simulations for Case 2. For the IEEE 9-Bus test system, the number of
critical elements Nn is set as 1. The identified critical element marked with the red oval is shown
in the Fig. 1. For the IEEE 14-Bus test system, the number of critical elements Nn is set as 1,
14
Table 3: Results of identifying the critical elements and corresponding initial disturbances
IDs of the critical elements Initial disturbances (p.u.)
Test Case 9-Bus (Nn = 1) 1 17.36
Test Case 14-Bus (Nn = 1) 3 4.73
Test Case 14-Bus (Nn = 2) 2 and 3 4.23 and 4.74
Figure 1: The identified critical element (marked with red oval) in the test case of the IEEE-9
Bus system. The number of critical elements is set as 1.
2, 3 or 4, respectively. The results are shown in Fig. 2.
B. Verification
In this subsection, the correctness of the numerical results generated by the ICRA, as reported in
Subsection A, are verified. For verifying Case 1, the computed initial disturbances are applied
to the corresponding elements (see Table 3) in the two test systems respectively. For verifying
Case 2, the optimality of the solution can be verified by brute force, i.e., by considering all the
possible combinations of branch outage cases with a given number of outage branches. More
specifically, the cascading failure model in Eq. (7) and the DC power-flow model in Eq. (11) from
the ICRA are used extensively, and the numerical simulation results on the critical elements and
disruptive disturbances are validated by disturbing the selected element with the computed
magnitude of disturbances in the corresponding IEEE Bus test systems. The final remaining
transmission power and/or the final network topology is proposed to quantify the disruption.
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Figure 2: The identified critical elements for the test case of the IEEE-14 Bus system when the
number of critical elements is set as 1, 2, 3 or 4, respectively.
In the following, the verification results are given.
For Case 1 in the IEEE 9-Bus test system, we apply the corresponding initial disturbance,
that is, u = 17.36 to the element 1 connected between bus 1 and bus 4. The corresponding
initial disturbance u = 17.36 equals the outage of the element 1. The evolution process of
transmission network topology is shown in Fig. 3. For the simulation results of Case 2, the
initial disturbances take form of element outage. After testing all the possible element outage
cases, we find all branches (elements) finally are broken when the element 1 is taken down, which
has the same result with Case 1 .
As we can see from Fig. 3, with the element 1 being broken as the initial disturbance, all the
branches (elements) are broken and the final remaining transmission power becomes zero. The
verification results are the same to the results presented in Table 3 and Fig. 1, which verifies the
correctness of proposed algorithm of ICRA.
For the IEEE 14-Bus test system, the initial power transmission is 3.07 p.u. when the power
system operates in normal status. For the simulation results of Case 1, when the number of
critical elements Nn is set as 1, we apply the corresponding initial disturbance, that is, u = 4.73
to the element 3 connected between bus 2 and bus 3. The remaining transmission power is 0.02
p.u. When Nn is set as 2, we apply the initial disturbances u2 = 4.23 and u3 = 4.73 to the
16
Figure 3: The diagram of propagation process of cascading failure and final power grid topology
with the element 1 being broken as the initial disturbance in the IEEE 9-Bus test system.
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Figure 4: The transmission power (in p.u.) left when the number of outage elements varies
from one to four in the IEEE 14-Bus test system and the combination of critical elements are
circled with read ovals.
element 2 (connected between bus 1 and bus 5) and the element 3 respectively. The remaining
transmission power becomes zero. For the simulation results of Case 2, we apply outage of one
element, two elements, three elements and four elements respectively as the initial contingencies.
We simulate all possible element outage cases when the number of outage elements varies from
one to four in the IEEE 14-Bus test system; the results are shown in Fig. 4.
As we can see from the Fig. 4, the outage of the element 3 results in the minimum remaining
transmission power, that is 0.02 p.u. When Nn = 2, the combinations (IDs of elements) [2, 3],
[2, 4] and [2, 5] lead to zero transmission power. The combination [1, 5, 6] results in zero trans-
mission power when Nn = 3. When Nn = 4, the combinations [1,2,3,9], [1,2,3,10], [1,2,3,11],
[1,2,3,12], [1,2,3,13], [2,4,6,7], [2,4,6,8], [2,4,6,9], [2,4,6,10], [2,4,6,11], [2,4,6,12] and [2,4,6,13] lead
to zero transmission power. From the verification results of Case 1 and Case 2 above for the
IEEE 14-Bus test system, we can verify the correctness of the simulation results in Table 3 and
Fig. 2.
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From the simulation and verification results on the IEEE 9-Bus and the IEEE 14-Bus test
systems, we may conclude that the proposed ICRA is effective.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, the problem of identifying critical risks of cascading failures in power systems
was formulated as a dynamic optimization problem (DOP) within the framework of optimal
control theory. By pinning the power system into the worst-case cascading blackout, the optimal
control inputs that reflect the critical elements and corresponding disturbances were determined
by solving the DOP. The ICRA based on the maximum principle was applied to solve the
DOP, which provides the necessary conditions for optimality of solutions. The correctness and
effectiveness of the ICRA have been verified by applying the computed initial disturbances or
elements outage to the corresponding elements in IEEE Bus systems. The efficient identification
of critical risks may help power system planners to reveal hidden catastrophic risks, preplan
system protection and recovery, and consequently improve system resilience. The research work
will be extended to include identifying critical risks as disturbances to network nodes and other
mechanisms such as generator tripping, load shedding and voltage collapse, etc. In a longer
term, we shall take into account the cost of protection and recovery while identifying the worst
cases.
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